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Abstract 
Remittances have historically been a stable source of funding which has played a key role in the 
development efforts of many nations worldwide. As a consequence of the Covid crisis and the lockdown 
measures imposed to counteract the spread of the disease, the World Bank estimated a drop of 20% in 
remittances by the end of 2020. To study the effect that such a conjuncture would have on the financial 
stability of developing economies, this paper develops a remittance stress test that investigates the 
impact of the projected shock on banking sector liquidity at a country level. The study encompasses 112 
countries and finds that small, emerging economies with underdeveloped financial sectors suffer the 
most, with six of the ten most affected nations experiencing a drop in their liquid asset ratios that would 
place their banking sector at significant liquidity risk. 
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1. Introduction 
For many economies, remittances are a vital inflow of funds that serve to finance current expenditures or 
constitute starting capital for business development. Their importance has grown significantly over the 
past 10 years, with remittances to developing economies reaching 529B USD in 2018, up by more than 
200B USD since 2009. 
Word Bank data shows remittances to be on an increasing trend and very close to overtaking FDIs, as the 
principal source of capital inflows to low and middle income countries. Furthermore, FDIs have the 
advantage of historically being relatively stable with a coefficient of variation of 0.79 over the 1990 – 2019 
timespan, which ranks slightly higher than that for FDIs (0.73), but significantly lower than that of portfolio 
investments which are known to be vulnerable to sudden stops and reversals (thus having a higher 
coefficient of variation of 0.92). 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of remittances compared to other flows of funds. Over the analysis period, 
remittances are the second fastest growing flow after FDIs, although data from the most recent years 
suggests that FDI growth is slowing. On the other hand, portfolio investments are unstable over time and 
are on a less steep growth path than remittances. They are subject to sharp declines during periods of 
instability or crises. As such, they experienced drops in the early 2000s, 2008 and 2015. At the opposite 
spectrum is the official development assistance, which is the most stable source of funding, but also the 
slowest growing and therefore insufficient to meet the financing needs of developing economies. 
 
Source: World Bank and IMF data 
Figure 1. Remittance flows to low and middle-income countries – a stable and growing stream of funds 
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Figure 1 shows different flows of capital to low and middle-income countries in billions of USD, as well as 
their trend throughout the period spanning from 1990 to 2019. Values for 2019 are estimates based on 
World Bank data. 
In light of the Great Lockdown imposed by the Coronavirus crisis, GDP fell worldwide and unemployment 
rose. As a consequence of the economy being placed on hold for three months, coupled with isolation 
measures and a slowdown in trade, the World Bank published a study1 on the resulting impact on 
remittances. Initial estimates anticipate a decline of about 20% of remittances worldwide, although the 
effect is different across regions. Table 1 summarizes the projected effect. 
Region 
Growth rate of 
remittances (%) 
Europe and Central Asia  -27.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa -23.1 
South Asia -22.1 
Middle East and North Africa -19.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean -19.3 
East Asia and the Pacific -13.0 
World Average -19.9 
 
 
 
To mitigate the negative impact on remittances, a joint initiative2 between the UK government and the 
Federal Council of the Swiss governments, as well as multiple international organizations (the World Bank, 
UNCDF, UNDP and the Asian Development Bank, among others) was initiated to promote remittances as 
an essential service, reduce transaction costs, improve coverage and facilitate the regulatory framework 
for service providers. 
To better study the extent to which the reduction in remittances has the potential of affecting the financial 
sector, as well as the economy more generally, this paper proposes a remittance stress test in the form of 
a scenario that investigates the effect of a shock to liquidity from the decline of remittances, utilizing a 
liquid asset ratio constructed for the purposes of this paper. 
2. Remittance stress test methodology 
2.1. Stress test structure and transmission channels 
The remittance stress test is constructed by taking in three inputs: liquid assets, total assets and 
remittance inflows. The liquid asset ratio is compiled by dividing liquid assets to total assets: 
                                                          
1 The study is accessible online and contains the reasoning used by the World Bank to produce its forecast, as well 
as the methodology used to produce remittance projections; https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2020-
06/R8_Migration%26Remittances_brief32.pdf 
2 The initiative call is accessible online and contains details regarding its objectives and the planned actions that 
signatory countries aim to perform; https://www.knomad.org/covid-19-remittances-call-to-action/ 
Table 1 depicts the highest anticipated decline 
for Europe and Central Asia, followed by the 
Sub-Saharan Africa Region and South Asia, each 
with a decline of over 22%. The Middle East and 
North Adrica, as well as Latin America and the 
Caribbean would register a drop of just under 
20% in remittances, while the East Asia and 
Pacific region would be the least affected, with 
a projected deline of 13%. The larger decrease 
in the Europe and Central Asia region come on 
the backdrop oh higher than average growth 
rates in 2019 of 6%, with Ukraine being the 
largest recepient of remmitances in the region. 
Source: World Bank, Knomad 
Table 1. Projections for the decline in remittances 
following the Great Lockdown 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠   (1) 
The next step is to construct the remittance shock on assets. After being transferred, the funds sent as 
remittances pass through the following channels, graphically depicted in Figure 2: 
1) liquidity held by the bank for the client’s current account 
2) after withdrawal by the client, the money is spent on products, services or as investment and, 
thus, enters the production circuit – which, in time, contributes to an increase of the liquid assets 
of the bank since the money will continue to be spent / parked and/or deposited in banks 
3) term deposits which could be slower to enter the production cycle and therefore result in an 
increase of assets of lower liquidity 
Source: author 
Figure 2. Remittance stress test mechanism 
As such, a 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 share of remittances will enter the bank’s balance sheet as liquid assets, with the rest of 
the amount 1 − 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 entering as less liquid assets. To this effect, one must calibrate or make assumptions 
about the coefficient 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄. 
2.2. Remittances and liquid assets: a review of the literature 
To investigate possible values for 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄, it is worthwhile to look at the literature on the impact of 
remittances on deposits. Aggarwal et al. (2006) use a simple linear regression model, followed by a GMM 
to estimate the impact of remittances on bank deposits, controlling for other factors that potentially affect 
bank deposits such as GDP, inflation, the exchange rate, exports, financial liberalization and others. In 
their paper, in the baseline model they find that increasing the remittance to GDP ratio by 1 induces an 
increase of the deposit to GDP ratio of roughly 0.5 - 0.6. When correcting for the potential impact of 
increased remittances due to declining costs in the face of increased competition and availability of 
financial transfer services by including time dummies, the coefficient of the impact of remittances on 
deposits drops to 0.2. The GMM presents a coefficient of remittances to deposits of 0.4 - 0.5, however 
using lags as instruments for the variables similarly reduces the impact from 0.4 to 0.19. Given that the 
study does not dissociate between short-term deposits, which, if taken into consideration, would further 
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increase the amount of remittances passing through as liquid assets, it is safe to assume that the 
coefficient 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 appropriate for the purposes of this stress test should be above 0.8 (given that 1 − 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 <0.2). 
According to Gunatilleke (1992) who performs a study on seven Asian countries, at most the unspent part 
of remittances held by receivers of funds constitutes one fifth of the funds received. The author, however, 
stresses that the remainder is held in deposits of varying liquidity and usually for shorter-term purposes 
or relatively rapid investment. This also suggests that the coefficient 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 should be above 0.8, but 
perhaps much larger than that if only a very small proportion of the received funds goes into term 
deposits. 
Cooray (2010) studies the positive impact of remittances on liquid assets in a regression including Liquid 
Assets / GDP as one of multiple independent variables. Barajas et al. (2016) mention another mechanism 
through which remittances generate an increase in liquid assets, especially in developing economies. In 
their paper, they speak about the fact that the liability increase resulting from the inflow of remittances 
does not translate into a one-for-one increase in private sector credit, and that the banks therefore retain 
a portion of the deposits opened with them by clients that do not wish to immediately withdraw (and 
spend / invest) the received funds. The effect is that banks will hold larger shares of liquid assets. 
Given the nature of remittance flows to developing economies which are the focus of the World Bank’s 
projections and call for action, and given that the literature suggests that the vast majority of remittances 
pass through into liquid assets, from the banking sector’s perspective, this paper will assume a 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 of 1, 
whereby the entirety of remittances pass-through into liquid assets. This assumption can be relaxed for 
more advanced economies, but for the purposes of having an equal shock applied to all the countries in 
the study, a unique value is retained. 
2.3. Applying the shock 
The third step is to apply the shock to the Liquid Asset Ratio. This is done by integrating the decrease in 
remittances into the Liquid Asset Ratio formula: 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 ∗ 𝛽𝑆𝐻𝐾 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 −  𝛽𝑆𝐻𝐾 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠   (2) 
Here, 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝑄 is the coefficient of pass-through of remittances to liquid assets, 𝛽𝑆𝐻𝐾 is the size of the shock 
to remittances. 
The retained value for 𝛽𝑆𝐻𝐾 = 0.2, given the projected decrease in remittances of 20%, as calculated by 
the World Bank. 
The stress tests should be interpreted as an answer to the following question: what would the Liquid Asset 
Ratio have been had remittances in the study period (i.e. past year) been 𝛽𝑆𝐻𝐾 % lower? In this sense, this 
is a retroactive stress test that uses current asset data and describes what the situation would have been 
like had remittances been lower and, thus, had the system received less of a liquidity injection. 
In this paper, the shock is applied to the cumulative assets of all the banking institutions in the economy, 
but the same methodology can be used on individual bank data. However, in this case, the stress tester 
must either: 
 1. Obtain data on the remittances received by each bank   – or – 
2. Construct a model that relates the volume of remittances received by each bank to other variables 
2.4. Setting a threshold for liquidity risk 
In this stress test, a threshold of 20% is introduced to reflect the fact that banking institutions that have 
less than 20% of assets in a liquid form are more prone to liquidity shortfalls and could, potentially, face 
difficulties in the event of a liquidity crisis (i.e. economic crisis followed by deposit withdrawals, a bank 
run, etc.). Of course, the 20% threshold is best used on individual bank data. This is because on an 
aggregate level, lower and higher performing banks in terms of liquidity even out, while at the individual 
level, significant disparities may exist. A supplementary buffer at 25% could be used as an early warning 
indicator to reflect increasing risk in the banking sector, as banks or banking sectors falling in the [20% ; 
25%] interval following the decline in remittances could risk a further worsening of their liquidity position 
in case of a supplementary shock to remittances or to liquid assets. 
3. Data 
3.1 Data sources 
This study uses data from the IMF and World Bank for 112 countries around the world. The constructed 
cross-sectional dataset, combines the following data sources: 
Indicator Unit Source Comments 
Core 
Liquid Assets Domestic Currency IMF, Financial Soundness 
Indicators Database  
 
Total Assets Domestic Currency IMF, Financial Soundness 
Indicators Database  
 
Remittances USD World Bank, Knomad  
Helper 
Exchange rate Domestic Currency 
Units per USD 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Used to convert indicators 
into a comparable base 
GDP* Domestic Currency IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Database 
Used to study whether size 
effects exist 
* GDP data reporting varies widely among countries in terms of periodicity of reporting and latest available 
data. As such, for the vast majority of countries, the latest available data is for 2018 at the time of writing 
this paper, however for some countries data for 2019 already exists, whereas for others, only data for 2017 
is available. 
Table 2. Data sources used as inputs to the stress test 
The constructed database is constrained by missing variables for a number of countries that either don’t 
fully report financial soundness indicators or where remittance data is absent. The map presented in 
Figure 3 below shows in blue those countries for which data is available. Most of the missing data is 
concentrated in Africa, however in Europe, there are also a number of countries that do not report all of 
the positions from the Financial Soundness Indicators database needed to produce the stress-test. The 
same is true for some countries in Asia and Southern America. 
Within the database, the Liquid Asset Ratio before the shock is calculated based on the Liquid Assets and 
Total Assets variables, after converting both of the indicators to USD. This transformation is needed in 
order to apply the shock to remittances, which are denominated in USD. After subtracting the share of 
remittances projected to decline, the Liquid Asset Ratio after the shock is obtained, and is subsequently 
compared with its counterpart from before the shock. 
 
Figure 3. Data availability map 
This map shows most countries in Africa to have unavailable data, as well as some countries in Europe, 
Asia and Latin America. The unavailable data, for the most part, is concentrated in the Financial Soundness 
Indicators database. 
3.2. Remittances, Liquidity and GDP - taking a closer look at the data 
Before proceeding with the study, it is 
worthwhile to check whether there are size 
effects that should be taken into 
consideration, as the dataset contains 
countries with widely varying characteristics. 
The chart presented in Figure 3, but also the 
construction of trend lines for each continent 
separately, as well as one globally, confirm 
this with the p-value of the coefficient 
associated with GDP in the regression of GDP 
on Liquid Assets being, at its lowest, 0.096 for 
Europe and, at its highest, 0.937 for the 
group of countries in South America. We, 
therefore, conclude that size effects play only 
a minimal role, if any. 
Figure 3. Liquid Asset Ratios uncorrelated with GDP 
  
 
         R2 = 0.632586; GDP p-value < 0.0001          R2 = 0.39612; GDP p-value = 0.0004362          R2 = 0.62477; GDP p-value < 0.0001 
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Figure 4. Size does matter for remittances, but not in all regions 
Figure 4 shows that there is a significant effect of GDP on remittances, and that this is especially true for 
Europe, Asia, Oceania and Africa. The effect is less clear for North and South America. 
As expected, size does play a role in terms of remittance volumes with Figure 4 showing this effect by 
region. In the Americas, however, the effect is more diffuse, owing to the smaller number of countries in 
the sample and the high level of disparity between the outlier countries and the other economies in the 
region. 
4. Stress Test Results 
One of the observations that this paper highlights is that advanced economies usually hold less liquid 
assets owing to the larger size of the economy, deeper financial markets with larger financing needs and 
a better utilization or absorption rate of financing. As such, most advanced economies have liquid asset 
ratios below 20%. Conversely, in many developing nations, higher levels of liquid assets are prevalent 
given the more prudent approach of local banks in their crediting operations or due to the absence of 
sufficient viable projects. 
An analysis of the liquidity situation in the banking sectors of the countries included in the study shows 
the division between the two groups of countries. 
 
Figure 5. The Liquid Asset Ratio prior to applying the shock 
Figure 5 depicts the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets for the banking sectors of countries at the end of 
2019. For some countries that have not yet reported the most recent data, this may correspond to the ratio 
at the end of 2018. Countries with a ratio above 20 are depicted in blue, with darker blue indicating a 
larger share of liquid assets to total assets. Countries with a ratio below 20 are shown in orange, with a 
darker orange indicating a lower liquid asset ratio. 
In Figure 5, the divide between countries with different liquidity stances becomes apparent. The disparity 
is, in part, explained by the development level of the economies and their financial systems, however 
other factors may also be at play. In particular, one can notice that China and India, which are both rapidly 
developing economies, have different liquidity situations. This may be due to the structure of the banking 
sector in terms if the number of banks operating in the market, but may also have to do with the risk-
taking strategy of the financial sector whereby in India the tolerance for risk and therefore the number of 
financed projects would be higher. 
The split between high liquidity and low liquidity countries is also visible in Europe where the divide occurs 
along a geographic dimension. Here, we notice Western European economies predominantly with lower 
levels of liquid assets, whereas their Eastern counterparts tend to have higher liquid asset ratios. Figure 6 
points towards this phenomenon being explained by the developmental reasoning presented above, and 
therefore highlights the hypothesis of absence of viable projects. However, factors such as preference for 
liquidity may reflect a more prudent stance of the banking sector which is confronted with a lower 
regulatory intervention power of the State and/or Central Bank in the developing nations of the East, in 
contrast with the vaster resources and unified framework present in Western nations, where the regulator 
can do more to stimulate the financial sector in the event of crises. 
 
Figure 6. A clash of two worlds in terms of liquidity 
Figure 6 shows the diverging trends in Western vs. Eastern Europe in terms of liquid asset holdings by the 
banking sector. The liquid asset ratio is presented on the horizontal axis, whereas GDP is shown on the 
vertical axis. Remittance data appears as circles with varying sizes, where larger circles represent countries 
with higher remittance inflows. Furthermore, countries are grouped according to their geographic 
positioning. The proposed 20% regulatory threshold of increased liquidity risk is shown as a vertical line. 
Liquid Asset Ratios are detailed in tables on the right of the figure for the countries included in the graph. 
Remittances and GDP data are presented in Bln. USD. 
Figure 6 shows Eastern European economies to be in a high-liquidity low-GDP situation, whereas the 
inverse is true for Western nations. A notable exception is Russia, which, given its size manifests more of 
the characteristics of Western economies. Similarly, Northern states are more similar to Western nations 
and Central economies tend to look similar to Eastern European countries, but the variation between 
these two regions is on a much smaller scale. 
Applying the remittance shock produces the highest impact on countries where remittances as a share of 
total assets are greatest. As a consequence of applying the shock, the liquid asset ratio for seven countries 
drops below the 20% threshold: 1 in Europe, 2 in Asia, 2 in North America, 1 in Africa and 1 in Oceania. 
The top ten countries in terms of the size of the impact on the liquid asset ratio are also amongst the 
smallest, with underdeveloped financial markets and a small share of national GDP to world GDP. Figure 
7 summarizes this finding and presents the liquid asset ratios before and after the shock, as well as the 
impact on the ratio for these economies. 
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Eastern Europe
Ukraine 72.28%
Romania 51.85%
Moldova, Rep. of 50.64%
Croatia, Rep. Of 34.43%
Latvia 31.82%
Bosnia and Herzeg 29.64%
Armenia, Rep. Of 27.07%
Bulgaria 26.60%
Kosovo, Rep. Of 26.05%
North Macedonia 24.02%
Russian Federation 23.63%
Montenegro 20.79%
Georgia 19.63%
Lithuania 18.30%
Estonia, Rep. Of 15.47%
Albania 15.10%
Belarus, Rep. Of 14.97%
Central Europe
Czech Rep. 26.44%
Slovenia, Rep. 25.95%
Hungary 24.75%
Slovak Rep. 24.02%
Poland, Rep. 15.81%
Northern Europe
Finland 18.02%
Sweden 17.34%
Denmark 13.85%
Iceland 12.20%
Norway 10.03%
Western Europe
Cyprus 38.38%
Malta 30.44%
Greece 29.62%
Ireland 25.64%
Luxembourg 24.73%
Austria 23.01%
Portugal 17.58%
Belgium 16.39%
Spain 15.78%
Italy 15.74%
France 13.66%
  
 
Figure 7. Top 10 most impacted countries by a shock to remittances 
Figure 7 presents the 10 countries with the highest impact of a 20% shock to remittances on the liquid 
asset ratio. On the left-hand side, the before and after liquid asset ratios are presented. On the right-hand 
side, the figure shows the impact. As a result of the shock, six of the ten countries shown in the graph 
would see their liquid asset ratio drop to levels under the 20% threshold (depicted as a red vertical line), 
which would be indicative of increasing liquidity risk in the banking sector. 
The complete impact analysis is presented for all countries included in the sample in Annex 1, where 
countries are grouped by region and sorted according to the size of their liquid asset ratios. 
Annex 2 shows the impact on the liquid asset ratio on a map to facilitate viewing the data for the large 
number of countries included in the study. 
Conclusion 
This paper developed a simple, but versatile methodology for stress testing the impact of a shock on 
remittances. The retained scenario for the analysis utilized projections published by the World Bank, 
whereby remittances were estimated to drop by around 20%. Indeed, the stress test showed that 
developing economies would be the most impacted by a reduction in the volume of remittances and 
would experience a weakening of the soundness of their banking sectors. Five out of the ten most 
impacted countries would experience a decline of their liquid asset ratios of above seven percentage 
points, and in six of the ten cases the ratio would drop below the proposed 20% risk threshold. A natural 
conclusion is that remittances continue to play a vital role for the stability of multiple emerging economies 
and a reduction in this historically stable flow of funds would undermine development efforts worldwide.   
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Annex 1 
Remittance Stress Test Results for the World 
This appendix shows the impact of a 20% drop in remittances on the Liquid Asset Ratio of the banking 
systems of 112 countries. The orange bar shows the ratio before applying the shock and the blue bar – 
thereafter. The orange portion of each bar corresponds to the decline in the liquid asset ratio. The vertical 
red line is the proposed 20% threshold under which banks could be more exposed to liquidity risks. 
 
 
 
  
Annex 2 
Impact of a Remittance Shock on the Liquid Asset Ratio 
This appendix shows the impact of a 20% drop in remittances on the Liquid Asset Ratio of the banking 
systems of 112 countries. Color represents the force of the impact with a darker red signifying a stronger 
impact. The size of the drop of the liquid asset ratio varies between 0 and 11.02 percentage points. 
 
 
 
